Anthony Kronman has argued that libertarians cannot distinguish non-arbitrarily between legitimate and illegitimate advantage-taking in contractual relations except by reference to a liberal, wealth-redistributive standard Kronman calls “paretianism.” We argue to the contrary that libertarians need not concede that any advantage-taking in contracts is legitimate and thus need not be liberal “paretians” with respect to advantage-taking.

The principles of Italian bankruptcy law are to be found in the general rules on patrimonial responsibility, by which (Article 2740 of the Italian Civil Code, at present in force) the debtor must try to meet his debts with all present and future assets, while his creditors have the same right to be paid out of the debtor’s said assets, except where there are legitimate rights of pre-emption (for example, privileges, special guarantees, mortgages).

Zusammenfassung

Unter der Bezeichnung „Ertragsteuern“ versteht dieses Buch

die Einkommensteuer mit der daranhängenden Kirchensteuer,

die Körperschaftsteuer und

die Gewerbeertragsteuer (das ist der Teil der Gewerbesteuer, der den Gewerbeertrag zur Bemessungsgrundlage hat).

Zusammenfassung

Wie der “Vorbemerkung” zu entnehmen ist, die Max Weber dem Band 1 seiner “Gesammelten Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie” vorangestellt hat (1), gilt sein Erkenntnisinteresse u.a. der Erklärung des spezifisch okzidentalen Rationalisierungsprozesses, der zu einer Reihe nur dem Okzident eigenen “Kulturerscheinungen” geführt hat. Weber gibt hierfür einige anschauliche Beispiele, die er in unsystematischer Folge präsentiert: nebst der rationalen Organisation der Verwaltung (des Staates) und der rational-kapitalistischen Organisation von formell freier Arbeit, betont er vor allem die rationale Struktur des Rechts und die Existenz eines fachgeschulten Juristenstandes sowie die Ausbildung einer rationalen “methodischen Lebensführung” , wobei zwischen diesen Befunden Entsprechungsverhältnisse — Weber hat hierfür den Terminus “Wahlverwandtschaft” reserviert — postuliert werden (2).

The judgment delivered on September 30, 1946, by the International Military Tribunal brought to a close the first prosecution instituted under the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, entered into by the governments of the United States, France, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. But the publication of the judgment stirred a new wave of sharp criticism of the moral and legal foundations of the Nuremberg Trial. The charge that the Tribunal itself, as well as the substantive law which it applied, was ex post facto was renewed with vigor. So was the charge that no real justice was done at Nuremberg, because vanquished war criminals only were brought before the Tribunal and no attempt was made to try alleged war criminals of the victorious nations.

It may be useful to ask at the outset what meaning is intended to convey by the words “universal international law.” It is a relatively new phrase which has come into vogue in the last few years, probably as a result of more intensely perceived ideological division in the world, the insistence on a common set of values as a precondition for a viable legal order, and, more recently, the challenge to the traditional body of doctrine and precept emanating from new States in Asia and Africa. It may be a matter of judgement whether the various controversies are of greater importance to scholars or to state practice. To be sure, the world is ideologically divided; the existence of common values among the different States and cultures is a matter of doubt, and jurists in various countries are preoccupied with the attitude, or more concisely, attitudes of new States toward international law. The actual impact of these factors on international law is not so easily perceived. Surely, international law is evolving, as it has in the past, in response to new needs, to technological developments, to the family of nations. No one in his right mind would want to have it otherwise. But clearly the forward movement of the law has not been the same in all its branches.

Zusammenfassung

Das VVG kennt nicht nur Obliegenheiten, die der Versicherungsnehmer zu beachten hat, sondern auch solche, die vom Versicherer zu erfüllen sind, mag auch mißverständlich von „Pflichten“gesprochen werden. Hierher gehört die Obliegenheit, den Versicherungsnehmer auf Abweichungen vom Antrag aufmerksam zu machen (§ 5 II VVG), eine klarstellende Kündigung auszusprechen (§6 I Satz 3 VVG), den Versicherungsnehmer und den geschädigten Dritten zu belehren (Obliegenheiten nach §§ 12 III, 39 Satz 2, 158e I Satz 2 VVG).