In multi-tiered organizations, individuals can engage in unproductive rent-seeking activities both within and between the divisions of the organization. Nevertheless, a multi-tiered organizational structure can induce efficiency gains by decreasing rent-seeking. We present a model of production and simultaneous internal and external rent-seeking, assuming a logistic contest success function. In equilibrium, there is generically either internal or external rent-seeking, but not both. A multi-tiered organization leads to less rent-seeking and higher welfare, even though the production technology gives no reason for any specific organizational structure. Our findings constitute a new efficiency rationale for multi-tiered organizations.

Conclusion

Maximizing social welfare when there is one foreign firm requires the imposition of fixed domestic price, which results in increased imports from the foreign firm until it engages in marginal cost pricing. A license fee captures (replaces) the foreign firm's economic profit (loss). Extension to the case where foreign supply consists of more than one firm differs from the one-firm analysis in that, while optimale policy consists of the setting of both a license fee and price level for the import, this may entail levying a tariff on imports from the foreign firms. The fee or tariff, but not both, may be negative.

This paper aims to study those firms which have similar characteristics at the beginning of time. The objective is to observe the relation that exists between technological evolution, firms' performances and economic instability. This is done using an adaptation of the Nelson and Winter model, in order to show the possibility of various growth trajectories, and also to underline the heterogeneity of the firms. This heterogeneity corresponds to a period of economic instability, and itself only exists as a result of the specific nature of the technological trend. The theoretical interest lies in using the structures/performances relation, by according a central place to innovation.

Sustainable development at both the national and the global level is increasingly acknowledged to be dependent upon the international trade system. The WTO Agreements and the continuing discussion in the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment are therefore examined here in the light of principles put forward by the International Institute for Sustainable Development. The current shortcomings in the WTO are analysed and some possible cornerstones for future WTO development indicated.

This article addresses issues associated with the modern regional and historical consciousness of the population, as well as the historical, geographical, and ethnocultural prerequisites for their formation within the confines of Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, and partially Voronezh oblasts. Assuming that the mentality of the local population harmonizes with the character of the historic and ethnocultural landscape, the author studies the spatial changes in the ethnocultural identity of localities and in the sociopsychological concepts of the residents, singling out zones characterized by the occurrence of elements of the Ukrainian culture.

This paper presents two characterizations of the core on the domain of all NTU games. One is based on consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game” and converse consistency with respect to “max-reduced game”. The other is based on consistency with respect to “max-reduced game” and weak converse consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game”. Besides, we introduce an alternative definition of individual rationality, we name conditional individual rationality, which is compatible with non-emptiness. We discuss axiomatic characterizations involving conditional individual rationality for the core.

This paper reports the results of an empirical investigation into the role of project scale, as reflected in consortium size, on the impacts obtained by partners participating in publicly-funded collaborative R&D projects. I argue in this study that scale may affect performance indirectly rather than directly. Specifically, I model the influence of scale as being mediated by a set of intervening variables that may be said to “transmit” both positive and negative effects through (i) complementarity of resources, (ii) learning, and (iii) transaction costs in project implementation. Moreover, I hypothesize that these indirect effects are conditional on certain moderators that include resources committed, project management mechanisms, and project uncertainty and scope. The results offered in this study largely confirm the proposition of conditionally-mediated effects of scale on performance. They indicate that a number of conditional indirect effects are indeed significant, and surprisingly, that these effects are mostly negative.