With information asymmetry between contracting parties, adverse selection may result. A separation may be achieved if low-risk types can signal their identity—for example, by selecting from a menu of price-quantity contracts. In such models, signaling is costly and solutions are, at best, second best. These models characterize risk types by differences in the probability, rather than in severity, of the costs they impose. However, when severity differences also are considered, first best solutions become feasible. We identify the circumstances in which costly separating equilibria prevail and those in which full-information equilibria can be attained.

This article integrates aspects of traditional insurance with advances in financial economics, yielding proper valuation and premium assessments of insurance benefits linked to various financial assets. Several new types of unit-linked life insurance contracts are discussed, with substantial potential for real-life applications. Compared to usual unit-linked products, these contracts offer added flexibility and/or altered exposure to financial risk for the insured and/or the insurer. The single premiums of these policies are calculated as expectations under a risk-adjusted probability measure (equivalent martingale measure), satisfying no-arbitrage conditions in financial markets.

One of the most active areas of research in financial economics has been the modeling of the term structure of interest rates and its relationship to the pricing of contingent claims. There is a vast array of issues in the area, as well as a variety of perspectives, ranging from theoretical to practical. This article provides a general framework for the analysis of issues in the modeling of the term structure. Specifically, this article provides an overview of the conceptual issues and the empirical evidence in the area, based on an examination of five seminal models by Black, Scholes, and Merton; Vasicek; Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross; Ho and Lee; and Heath, Jarrow, and Morton. The article provides a synthesis of the area and suggests directions for future research.

It is shown that the effect of increased probability of loss on the demand for insurance depends on whether both insured and insurer are aware of the change. When both insurer and insured share the same beliefs about the probability of loss (symmetric information), an increase in the loss probability may lead risk-averse agents to demandless insurance.

This paper discusses some aspects of the robustness of the classical insurance paradigm with respect to departures from the independence axiom of expected utility theory. The discussion focuses on the significance of the distinction between risk aversion and outcome convexity and the role of smoothness of the preferences in non-expected-utility analysis of insurance.

In this paper an economic model of the firm's behaviour is presented, examining the interrelationship between prevention activities and employment level. A competitive firm with a fixed capital stock is considered. Two decisions must be made: the level of employment of homogeneous workers (L) and the level of prevention activities (I). Although many simplifying assumptions are adopted, the impact of wage rate and compensation level on both decision variables is sign ambiguous. Moreover the case where injured workers are irreplaceable is more difficult than its counterpart with perfect substitutability.

The paper examines the implications of the commission system for the price of life assurance products and the quality of advice provided by brokers. The competitive equilibrium is shown to be neither first best nor second best efficient. The sources of the inefficiencies are examined and the effects of policy measures considered.

Researchers often assume that preferences over uncertain consumption streams are representable by $$E\left[ {\left( {{1 \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {1 \gamma }} \right. \kern-\nulldelimiterspace} \gamma }} \right)\sum\limits_{t = 0}^x {\delta ^t \tilde c_t^\gamma } } \right]$$ , where $$\tilde c_t $$ , is (random) period t consumption. It is moreover often asserted that estimates of γ cannot be unambiguously interpreted, since the quantity 1 − γ measures both relative risk aversion and the reciprocal of the elasticity of substitution. Clearly, this ambiguity arises only if 1 − γ indeed measures risk aversion. Although changes in γ cannot reflect changes in risk aversion according to standard definitions of comparative multivariate risk aversion, we show that γ is rationalizable as a risk aversion measure provided that the “acceptance set” of sure prospects is restricted. We also show, however, that there is essentially no relationship between changes in γ and optimal consumption, even in a simple two period model; this finding casts doubt upon the interpretation of γ as a risk aversion measure.